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Stimulating affordable, accessible infill development is essential if Sydney’s housing deficit is to 
be reduced without the environmental impacts of large scale Greenfield development. But despite 
a Metro Strategy that targets 70% of new development for infill sites, an enhanced array of 
Commonwealth and State housing supply subsidies, and increased state government intervention 
in development regulation, too little affordable market rate housing is being developed (NHSC 
2010). One important reason claimed by some commentators is that low-priced housing is not 
financially feasible in accessible locations. Some interesting recent analyses have identified a 
significant gap between the costs of housing development and the price at which it will sell, and 
suggest that merely increasing densities will not resolve this problem (NHSC 2010; Graus 2010). 
Is it possible to rethink the form in which subsidies are provided, or the ways that development is 
regulated, to enable developers to produce housing that is both affordable and accessible?       
 
This paper investigates this question, using a hypothetical set of development options for three 
sites in Sydney’s middle ring suburban southwest. I focus on market rate housing affordable to 
new home buyers (although there is significant overlap with the provision of affordable market 
rate rental housing). I do not address the provision of social housing which generally provides 
deeper subsidies to low income households, although the argument presented here may have 
implications for subsidized housing provision. Sydney’s housing affordability problems stretch 
quite far up the income distribution, with median home prices reaching $625,488 in mid-2010 
(APM 2010).  
 
I begin by reviewing the metropolitan area’s development environment, examining major 
explanations for the housing deficit, and recent research on the impacts of current homeowners’ 
subsidies. I discuss briefly the literature on the significance of infill development (and transit 
accessibility) for both environmental sustainability and affordability. Next, I summarize the 
results of recent research on the housing cost-price gap. Based on the gap identified in this 
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research, I discuss alternative ways the cost-price gap could be filled to make moderately priced 
housing feasible in infill locations with good public transport access. I develop a series of 
sensitivity analyses to test out these alternatives in three locations. The paper concludes by 
summarizing the policy implications of the analysis.   
 
Affordable housing development challenges in Sydney 
Sydney’s development environment 
 
Sydney has one of the least affordable housing markets in Australia, and is routinely ranked one 
of the least affordable (relative to resident incomes) in the Anglo world (Demographia 2010). The 
state’s projections that the metropolitan area will grow from 4.2 million people in 2010 to 6 
million in 2036 (NSW Department of Planning 2010) raise difficult questions about how the 
housing market will cope with this growth. Estimates put the current NSW housing deficit at 
approximately 99,000 homes (Johanson 2010). Future population growth will require an 
additional 770,000 new homes by 2036 (NSW Department of Planning 2010). Residential 
development has not kept pace with household growth, even given that households have grown 
less fast than we would expect based on population (because average household size has 
remained fairly high at 2.51) – a classic indicator of frustrated demand, reflecting households 
doubling up as a response to high housing prices.  
 
There are several explanations for this shortfall, advanced by different actors. The slow pace of 
development approvals, and lack of appropriately zoned land, are major barriers argued by the 
development industry (Urban Task Force Australia 2010; Johanson 2010; UDIA 2010; 
Demographia 2010). Others argue that urban growth boundary-related constraints on the supply 
of Greenfield sites had increased housing prices in Sydney (Commonwealth of Australia 2008). 
But although rezoning has accelerated since then, new housing supply has continued to shrink 
(NSW Dept of Planning 2009). Consequently, others argue that speculative land holding and 
unwillingness to sell released land is another barrier (Commonwealth of Australia 2008; Council 
of Social Services NSW 2010). The NSW Dept of Planning has intervened to try to simplify and 
reform the development approval process, and is now engaged in attempting to speed the land 
sales process (NSW Department of Planning 2006; NSW Premier’s Office 2010). Limitations on 
developer contributions have been imposed, in response to criticisms that entry fees and taxes 
have risen sharply and have not been capitalized into land prices, as economic theory predicts 
they should (NSW Premier’s Office 2010; Pendall 1999). Other research has pointed to the limits 
on effective demand, with prospective home buyers unable to afford housing constructed at 
market rates (City Futures 2010; Randolph 2008). Small-scale investors compete with first time 
buyers for affordably priced existing housing.  
 
The intense debate about how to match housing supply more closely with current and projected 
demand reflects the politicization of the development process. Overlaid on this, the State’s 
metropolitan strategy aims to achieve environmental sustainability goals as well as housing 
affordability goals, introducing a new layer of conflict (Campbell 2001). Strategic commitments 
to accommodating 70 percent of new development in infill locations will require densification 
throughout the metro area. This policy has been strenuously resisted in some locations (such as 
Ku-Ring-Gai) and embraced in others (such as the City of Sydney). In most LGAs, the need for 
densification has been accepted, but this has not translated into substantial infill development in 
most middle and outer ring suburbs (Randolph 2006; Searle 2007). LGAs are not necessarily 
opposed to densification, but they are often confused about how to stimulate such development, 
beyond zoning land that often remains undeveloped. Infrastructure availability is an important 
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barrier in some of these locations, but not all (Commonwealth of Australia 2010; Council of 
Social Services NSW 2010).            
 
Sydney’s development environment is complex, and its interrelated problems often appear 
intractable. Efforts to solve one type of barrier often have unanticipated consequences, worsening 
other barriers. Home buyer subsidies are good examples of this. The major subsidy, the First 
Home Owners’ Grant (FHOG), is a Commonwealth initiative, introduced to ease the transition to 
imposing GST on construction in 2001. Several analyses have provided strong evidence that 
while the FHOG may change the timing of home purchase it does little to increase affordability, 
primarily because the untargeted subsidy increases housing prices throughout the market (Martin 
2009; Bourassa and Yin 2006; Burke and Hulse 2010). The FHOG was supplemented for a 
limited period as an economic stimulus measure during the first stages of the GFC, with an 
additional supplement for buyers of newly constructed homes. Because most first-time home 
buyers are at the low end of the market, the concentration of demand likely increased prices 
rather than improving affordability or overcoming barriers to ownership (Martin 2009). But the 
vast majority of homes purchased were existing homes, and thus the grant may also have had 
very little impact on stimulating the construction industry (the intent of the $1 billion package). 
Instead, it helped support home prices through the first stage of the GFC (Burke and Hulse 2010). 
The NSW state government added a top-up subsidy to the FHOG until June 2010.  
 
As home purchases slumped once the enhanced subsidy ended, a new stimulus was introduced – 
waiver of stamp duty on newly constructed homes (the Home Builder’s Bonus). The stamp duty 
waiver is intended to stimulate construction more directly, as it is restricted to construction that 
has not yet commenced. It is also targeted to moderately priced homes (under $600,000), unlike 
the FHOG (NSW Government 2010). A similar stamp duty waiver on moderately priced homes 
in Western Australia in 2004 was found to have a significant impact on demand, increasing home 
purchases within the target price range by 22% compared with seasonally adjusted averages over 
the previous 17 years (Costello 2006, 12). Costello warns that such sharp increases in demand 
(which had noticeable effects on the aggregate housing market) may be capitalized into housing 
prices. Early indications from NSW’s stamp duty waiver are that it is having significant effects on 
stimulating demand for new construction, with 1,533 purchases under the scheme between July 1 
and September 9, 2010 (Roozendaal 2010).   
 
Is it possible for subsidies to achieve the following three goals simultaneously?  
• Avoid increasing market prices 
• Improve access to affordable housing for low to moderate income home buyers 
• Stimulate housing supply? 
  
The significance of infill development 
 
Some argue that the Metro Strategy’s sustainability goals add to the cost of housing by directing 
the major share to infill locations, and that there is an inevitable conflict between environmentally 
responsible development and affordable development (Urbis 2010; Urban Task Force Australia 
2010). But there are good counter arguments, and a growing body of evidence that affordability 
may be better protected in the long run by developing in a sustainable manner (Trubka, Newman 
and Bilsboro 2009; Blair, Prassad, Judd, Zehner, Soebarto, and Hyde 2004)). One set of 
arguments centres on the avoided costs for new infrastructure; a new home in an infill location in 
NSW is estimated to cost $80,000 less in new infrastructure on average than an identical home in 
a Greenfield location (Corelli 2010). If we extended this argument to include unpriced 
environmental resources that are lost to Greenfield development, this savings would likely be 
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greater. Infrastructure costs cannot be separated from the cost of housing; if they are not paid 
upfront by home buyers, they will be paid over time by all community residents (the relative 
equity of each of these options is an interesting question we do not address here).  
 
A second important argument is that home buyers purchase not just a dwelling but also a location. 
Low priced housing in a Greenfield location disconnected from job opportunities, essential 
services, and public transport alternatives, may not be very affordable once a household is 
covering the costs of a car for each job holder and a weekly travel budget that adds to the burden 
of mortgage repayments (Dodson and Sipes 2008). Time spent in traffic jams has an opportunity 
cost that is considered carefully by many prospective home buyers, and accessible infill locations 
are likely to be judged more affordable by many different demographic groups. The housing-
transport affordability nexus is explicitly recognized in “location-efficient mortgage” programs 
piloted in some U.S. cities (Krizek 2003)   
   
From a broader sustainability perspective, affordable housing located close to job centres can 
improve economic sustainability by providing “workforce” housing. Social divisions will be 
reduced if affordable housing is integrated into existing communities offering a wide range of 
services, recreational options, and livability (Randolph 2008). The carbon impacts of increased 
car travel (and the environmental impacts of oil dependence) impose substantial costs that we 
probably do not measure very accurately (Newman and Kenworthy 2006; Trubka, Newman and 
Bilsborough 2009).  
 
Is it possible for infill housing development to achieve the following three goals simultaneously? 
• Increase access to affordable housing 
• Make best use of existing infrastructure investments, and minimize new infrastructure 
needs 
• Improve access to jobs, amenities, and services in affordable suburbs? 
 
The housing cost-price gap 
 
 While existing housing is likely to offer the most affordable home ownership alternatives, 
Sydney’s projected population growth demonstrates clearly that affordable new construction is 
also needed. And, if we are to densify the metro area appropriately, some redevelopment of 
existing lower density inner and middle ring suburbs is unavoidable. Densification makes sense 
around existing transport infrastructure, because it will enable us to use that scarce resource far 
more effectively. Increased densities are often the first sorts of regulatory bonus considered to 
improve affordability. But assessments of the financial feasibility of potential development 
locations around existing heavy rail stops suggest that denser housing types may not be feasible 
in those locations (Graus 2010).  
 
Graus bases his assumptions on current typical market prices in one location, Padstow station in 
Sydney’s Southwest (shown outlined in red in Figure 1). Padstow, in the Bankstown LGA, is a 
relatively low cost suburb with a mix of older single-family homes with some small walk up 
apartment buildings. It borders an industrial district, and is well located relative to larger job 
centres around Botany Bay. In principle, Padstow is a promising location for new affordable 
housing development taking advantage of train connections and local services in Bankstown. 
Graus’s analysis is particularly interesting because it is based on the characteristics of a specific 
local housing market; but it has the potential to be generalized to the wider metropolitan area, 




Based on typical construction and land costs, and sales prices, assuming a standard five percent in 
overheads and ten percent in holding costs, the analysis suggests some interesting things. First, 
denser housing is not necessarily more feasible. Because construction costs do not vary much 
between different housing typologies, but land and sales prices do, in a location with relatively 
low land prices financial returns do not increase in a linear relationship with density. Graus finds 
that single-family homes are infeasible, but walk up apartment buildings (the densest option 
considered) also offer a negative return. Medium density options such as terrace homes produce 
the best return, although the return is somewhat lower than expected market returns, which are 
estimated currently at about 12.5 percent (Chong 2010).  They are substantially higher however 
than the average negative market returns to residential developers, estimated by NHSC (2010).  
 
Table i: Gross Margin Analysis 
 
 
Source: Graus 2010 
 
In markets where housing prices are higher (most of the Eastern or Northern suburbs, for 
instance), land prices (and sales prices) are such that higher densities would indeed increase 
returns and thus improve financial feasibility. But those are not affordable markets, as Figure 1 







This poses a conundrum: developing affordable market rate infill housing may not be financially 
feasible in the locations where prices are lowest. Developers may be acting quite rationally when 
they fail to take advantage of the development opportunities offered by rezoned land (even 
assuming that land prices do not rise to reflect regulatory gains). In light of this analysis, 
continued declines in development rates, despite stimulus spending, high and increasing demand, 
and large-scale rezonings of residential land, may be more explicable.  
 
How do we begin to address this gap?  
 
One answer is to try to raise prices, by making locations like Padstow more attractive to the 
households who would bid up housing prices. But this raises what we might call the 
“gentrification” dilemma. While dense neighbourhoods should indeed have high quality 
amenities, and densification of accessible locations is likely to increase attractiveness to new 
retail and service providers, relying on a “place regeneration” strategy is both expensive, and 
counterproductive if our goal is also to increase the supply of affordable housing (Randolph 
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2008). Walk up apartments in Padstow that command a market price of $380,000 offer a scarce 
resource: newly built, accessible housing affordable to households earning approximately 
$84,000 (based on author’s calculations).   
 
If we are to close the feasibility gap while retaining the affordable price, we could also try 
addressing the other side of the equation: developers’ willingness to build lower priced housing. 
There are two main ways to do this: by regulating developer decisions in some way, or by 
changing the returns they receive.  
 
Regulatory strategies: Inclusionary zoning (requiring or encouraging developers to set aside a 
percentage of homes at lower than market prices) is one option. Inclusionary zoning requirements 
can be mandatory (in which case they generally account for quite a small percentage of total 
units). South Australia adopted inclusionary zoning as one component of its Housing Plan for 
South Australia in 2005, requiring developers to set aside ten percent of units for low-income 
households and five percent for households with special needs. Local programs in Green Square, 
Pyrmont-Ultimo and Willoughby set aside much smaller percentages, but also allow developers 
to make an in-lieu cash contribution, and thus act more like housing impact fees than inclusionary 
zoning (Housing NSW 2010 Mandatory policies; Gilmour 2010; Williams 2000).  
 
But most regulatory schemes have used a voluntary approach, with set asides being rewarded 
with higher densities, lower parking requirements, or some other regulatory bargaining chip that 
compensates developers for taking a below market return on some homes (Calavita, Grimes, and 
Mallach 1997; Gurran 2008). They do raise some problems. Regulatory incentives do not 
necessarily compensate developers, especially in relatively slack markets like Padstow. The 
extent to which incentives can offer sufficient cross-subsidies can vary dramatically as market 
conditions change, so that without constant updating and re evaluation they may result in massive 
over- or under-subsidies. Mandatory schemes avoid this, but are very difficult to gain acceptance 
for if they impose significant costs on developers (and thus cross-subsidy burdens on other home 
buyers) (Powell and Stringham 2005; Brunick 2004; Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach 1997).  
 
Planning bonuses (such as density increases and careful design of smaller lots) have been used to 
offset the costs of lower priced housing in a few demonstration projects. LandCom’s Forest Glade 
development in Blacktown set aside 20% of 63 units for lower income households and those with 
special needs, with deed restrictions and a second mortgage to control resale. The agency reported 
that the project succeeded financially, but it represented a small-scale demonstration that has not 
been widely repeated (LandCom n.d.; Beer, Kearins and Pieters 2007).   
 
Subsidy strategies: subsidizing market gaps to achieve a publically agreed good is a more direct 
and, potentially, equitable approach. It clarifies the value placed on public goals, and provides a 
transparent path to achieve them. But subsidies are contentious because they redistribute (if they 
are well designed subsidies, away from some better off parties), and of course they cost money. 
They can easily be poorly designed, leaking into the pockets of those they were not designed to 
benefit, spreading largesse too widely, and subsidizing actions that would have occurred anyway 
(as the above discussion of the FHOG argued). But despite this pitfall, well-designed and well-
targeted subsidies have considerable potential to stimulate development that is not financially 
feasible otherwise. Collectively, current home buyers receive a considerable subsidy in the form 
of the FHOG. The funds spent on that subsidy could be restructured in several more beneficial 
ways. The following section of this paper examines whether the housing cost gap example 




Filling the housing cost gap 
 
This section of the paper develops a hypothetical model, and reports the results of several 
sensitivity analyses to investigate whether capital or other subsidies could address the dilemma 
that new affordable market rate infill housing may be financially infeasible. I extend the analysis 
summarized above, looking at three similar suburbs in Sydney’s middle ring southwestern 
suburbs. The three suburbs were chosen because they have train stations and are within 35 to 45 
minutes of Town Hall Station. While not all residents would work in the CBD, I use this as a 
generalisable measure of accessibility to job centres. I constructed an analysis for a hypothetical 
apartment complex, assuming a FSR of 1.5, and for a hypothetical townhouse complex, assuming 
a FSR of 0.5. I use estimates of housing costs derived from NHSC (2010), and land prices based 
on the Department of Lands and Property Management data for indexed residentially zoned land 
sales in the three suburbs (NSW Land and Property Authority 2010). I estimated likely sales 
prices based on suburb-wide averages reported by the NSW Department of Housing for the first 
quarter of 2010 (NSW Department of Housing 2010), and property searches for new two 
bedroom one bathroom apartments that were sold or offered for sale in the three suburbs in mid-
2010. Nevertheless, the assumptions are approximate; the three examples should be understood as 
hypothetical rather than “real” locations. They illustrate three points on the continuum we might 
encounter in “low-value” suburbs: low land prices / low sales prices (Wiley Park); high land 
prices / high sales prices (Oatley); and moderate-low land prices / moderate-high sales prices 
(Riverwood). My purpose is to illustrate the challenges one might encounter in manipulating 






Table ii summarises the “base case” model. One of the locations (Riverwood) shows a positive 
return for the apartment complex, although the margin is much lower than most developers would 
find acceptable currently. Both Wiley Park and Riverwood have positive returns for the 
townhouse development, but just barely in the case of Wiley Park. Riverwood’s combination of 
somewhat lower land prices and somewhat higher sales prices make the townhouse complex a 
potentially feasible development project (not coincidentally, Riverwood has seen recent 
development of this type).  Neither townhouses nor apartments are feasible in Oatley (under these 
assumptions), given the high land prices relative to sales prices. As Figure 2 shows, Oatley has 
seen quite rapid recent price increases.  
 
 Table ii Base case model and assumptions 
APARTMENTS    
  Wiley Park Oatley Riverwood 
Land  $36,865 $71,111 $44,744 
construction  $250,000 $250,000 $250,000 
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development $20,845 $23,039 $24,082 
taxes, fees $31,489 $34,286 $34,124 
Holding costs $28,947 $36,375 $31,258 
     
subtotal  $370,130.38 $418,640.99 $386,616.88 
GST owed $37,013.04 $41,864.10 $38,661.69 
total cost  $407,143.42 $460,505.08 $425,278.57 
     
sales price $395,000.00 $445,000.00 $439,000.00 
Margin  -$12,143.42 -$15,505.08 $13,721.43 
Percent margin -3.07% -3.48% 3.13% 
     
TOWNHOUSES    
  Wiley Park Oatley Revesby 
Land  $110,594 $213,333 $134,231 
construction  $280,000 $280,000 $280,000 
development $20,845 $23,039 $24,082 
taxes, fees $34,066 $39,257 $37,252 
Holding costs $45,923 $67,241 $51,430 
     
subtotal  $497,385 $634,360 $534,224 
GST owed $49,738 $63,436 $53,422 
total cost  $547,123 $697,796 $587,646 
     
sales price $550,000 $650,000 $640,000 
Margin  $2,877 -$47,796 $52,354 
Percent margin 0.52% -7.35% 8.18% 
 
Note: Estimates were constructed using typical land costs from NSW Department of Land and 
Property, and typical development costs for infill residential development from NHSC (2010).  
  
I develop a series of sensitivity analyses to test out first the individual and then the cumulative 
effects of a series of potential subsidy strategies. These subsidy strategies are:  
• Increase densities, from 1.5 FSR to 3.0 FSR for apartments, and from 0.5 FSR to 0.6 FSR 
for townhomes. Increasing density for apartments will change construction costs, as 
larger buildings will entail additional construction costs such as elevators and more 
expensive foundations; the minor increase in density for townhomes will not have similar 
effects, because construction processes will remain similar.  
• Reduce development time, from the Sydney average of 16 months for development and 
planning to the average 7 months for development and planning in Brisbane (keeping the 
average construction period of 18 months constant) (NHSC 2010). 
• Reduce rates on the interest payable during development and construction to a subsidized 
rate of 5% (government bonds could be used to provide a pool of construction and 
development financing at below market rates).    
• Reduce infrastructure charges on new development, from $15,000 to $10,000.  
• Use the standard first-home buyer subsidy ($7,000) to reduce capital costs of 
development for each unit.  
• Use the incremental first-home buyer subsidy offered to home buyers during the GFC 




Table iii shows the effects of each of these strategies on the margins estimated for each 
hypothetical development.  
 
Table iii: Sensitivity analysis of individual strategies  
APARTMENTS    TOWNHOUSES  
  
Wiley 
Park Oatley Revesby 
Wiley 
Park Oatley Revesby 




Increase density -5.36% -0.05% 2.34% 5.28% 0.42% 13.15% 
Reduce development time 








charge by $5,000 -1.68% -2.25% 4.38% 1.52% 
-
6.51% 9.04% 
Capital subsidy $7,000  -0.99% -1.64% 5.00% 2.02% 
-
6.09% 9.46% 





Because construction costs increase for denser apartments, increasing densities reduces rather 
than enhances returns. The hypothetical development is even less likely to be feasible at higher 
densities. For townhomes, however, a small increase in density results in positive returns; in the 
case of Riverwood, where sales prices are higher relative to land prices, margins on townhomes 
would be attractive. Reducing the length of the development process would have some positive 
effects on margins, but not sufficient alone to make the hypothetical developments feasible.  
Reducing the interest payable on land holding and construction costs would be more effective; 
margins turn positive for both apartments and townhomes in Wiley Park and Riverwood (but not 
Oatley). Reducing interest rates has more positive effects than reducing infrastructure charges in 
all cases. The standard home buyer subsidy is not sufficient to fill the financing gap for 
apartments in Wiley Park and Oatley, but returns turn barely positive when the enhanced grant is 
used to offset capital costs. 
 
Individually, subsidy strategies are not sufficient to make most of the hypothetical developments 
feasible. In practice, subsidies could be combined to capture positive interaction effects. The 
cumulative effects of strategies are explored in Table iv. The combinations tested are:  
• Enhanced capital cost subsidy, and reduce development / planning time to 7 months.  
• Enhanced capital cost subsidy, reduce development time, and increase density (to 3.0 
FSR for apartments, 0.6 FSR for townhomes)  
• Enhanced capital cost subsidy, and reduce interest rates on holding costs. 
• Enhanced capital cost subsidy, reduce development time, and reduce interest rates on 
holding costs. 
• Enhanced capital cost subsidy, reduce development time, and reduce infrastructure 
charges.  
• Enhanced capital cost subsidy, reduce development time, reduce interest rates on holding 




Table iv: Sensitivity analysis of combined strategies 
APARTMENTS    TOWNHOUSES  
  
Wiley 
Park Oatley Riverwood 
Wiley 
Park Oatley Riverwood 
Capital subsidy + reduce time 1.98% 1.49% 7.82% 4.94% 
-
2.66% 12.23% 
Capital subsidy + reduce time + 
increase density -3.76% -0.99% 3.27% 9.51% 4.79% 16.99% 
Capital subsidy + reduce 
construction interest 4.23% 3.55% 9.89% 6.81% 
-
0.97% 13.88% 
Capital subsidy + reduce time + 
reduce construction interest 5.36% 5.35% 11.12% 8.98% 2.47% 16.14% 
Capital subsidy + reduce time + 
reduce infrastructure charge 3.37% 2.72% 9.08% 5.94% 
-
1.81% 13.09% 
Capital subsidy + reduce time + 
reduce construction interest + 
reduce infrastructure charge 6.76% 6.59% 12.37% 9.98% 3.32% 17.00% 
 
 
The combination of an enhanced capital cost subsidy and reducing development time results in a 
positive margin for all hypothetical apartment options, and the townhome developments in Wiley 
Park and Riverwood. However, margins for apartment developments are reduced when densities 
are increased, even with the enhanced capital subsidy and reduced time. One consistent finding of 
this analysis is that increasing densities does not necessarily improve the feasibility of new 
apartment developments in low value suburbs. Combining enhanced capital cost subsidies with a 
lower interest rate on holding costs has far more positive effects, with margins for all three 
apartment developments becoming solidly positive. A further development of this option, adding 
in reduced development time, further increases the hypothetical margin (while reducing the 
foregone interest costs to government). This option is superior to the next one, which combines 
an enhanced capital cost subsidy, reduced development time, and reduced infrastructure charges. 
The final option combines all four strategies (excluding increased densities); even in the most 
difficult market considered here, margins increase to about 6.5%, while margins approach current 
market expectations for the easiest development location. For townhomes, margins approach 10% 
in Wiley Park. The margin of 17% for townhome development in Riverwood indicates over-
subsidy; in fact, in such a relatively high priced / low land cost location, increasing densities 
alone would be sufficient for developers to achieve or exceed a target margin of 12.5%.  
 
The strategic, incentive-based approach developed here will entail public costs (beyond the funds 
redirected from the FHOG). It will also remove down payment assistance from first-home buyers 
and redirect those revenues to covering development costs. These are evaluated in a separate 
analysis; the net impacts of this strategy on government resources and first home buyers are 
found to be modest to negligible (author 2010).   
 
Implications for policy 
 
The first conclusion the above analysis suggests is that different levels of subsidy are needed in 
different markets; if we had modeled these impacts over time, we would likely find that the 
feasibility gap changes considerably as assumptions about market conditions change. Similarly, 
markets exhibit different sorts of constraints on feasibility; different combinations of subsidies 
have different impacts across the six alternatives. This is hardly surprising, but it raises an 
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important challenge: such a process removes predictability and certainty, relying, as it must on 
case-by-case negotiations over a moving target. Would this uncertainty further undermine the 
development environment?  
 
The key point here is to distinguish between unpredictable outcomes (will decisions arbitrarily 
change the project’s feasibility?) and negotiated outcomes (a variety of means may be used to 
accomplish a clearly defined outcome – a financially feasible development project that delivers 
low priced new housing). Understanding that precise regulatory and subsidy decisions will be 
based on prevailing market conditions, and that agreements will be aimed at making a particular 
benchmark margin feasible (though not guaranteeing it), provides far greater predictability than 
business as usual. Designing one size fits all subsidies is a very inefficient approach – either too 
much subsidy is provided in order to deal with the “difficult” cases, or too little is provided to 
eliminate waste, so that “difficult” cases are abandoned at the outset.   
 
Second, although one of the six alternatives was likely to achieve competitive margins with very 
little intervention, even in the best case scenario (combining five different subsidy sources) three 
of the options were unlikely to come close to the current benchmark of 12.5%. So why would a 
rational developer choose to go through a negotiation process with little hope of achieving returns 
competitive with other development options? Admittedly, these returns are somewhat superior to 
those estimated for infill development in NSW by NHSC (2010). However, there is little to 
support the expectation that developers would willingly accept returns like these when scarce 
resources could be far more profitably used serving higher priced markets with higher margins.  
 
There are three ways to address this:  
• increase capital subsidies where needed to make returns competitive (thus increasing the 
volatility of costs to the state) 
• expand the number of developers to increase competition for more marginal sites and 
projects (desirable in the long run but difficult to accomplish immediately), or 
• require that a proportion of developments in accessible locations meet “market” 
affordability targets. Earlier, we reviewed some of the objections to mandatory 
inclusionary zoning programs. Do they apply here?  
Typical objections that mandatory inclusionary zoning merely shifts subsidies to other new home 
buyers may not apply. Negotiating the appropriate subsidy to make lower priced homes 
financially feasible ensures that there are no burdens to redistribute narrowly; the only burden is 
the somewhat lower (but still positive) margin on some homes. A reasonably substantial 
proportion of affordable homes could be provided under such a regime, especially as some 
benefits (such as speeding development approval times) will apply to the entire development, 
increasing margins on more expensive homes too. Thus, it may be possible to use incentives 
flexibly to overcome legitimate concerns about imposing new requirements. An important finding 
from international experience with subsidy programs in general is that complexity and delays can 
be a disincentive to developer participation, regardless of financial returns. But complexity and 
delay is not inevitable; they result from institutional factors that can be addressed.  
 
Third, if a negotiated set of incentives were to replace the existing poorly targeted FHOG, with 
more generous support provided to some new construction, how do we ensure that this increases 
the affordable housing supply? This question has two components – managing the end prices 
charged so that developers do not capture the capital and other subsidies if the market turns up 
before project completion, and ensuring that subsidies have a long-term impact on affordability. 
One of the key difficulties raised by the FHOG is that its benefits (to the extent they exist) are 
dissipated; the grant must be renewed for each new cohort of buyers, to purchase “affordability” 
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afresh. Is there a more effective way to deliver supply-side incentives in a more (financially) 
sustainable model?          
   
Directly regulating prices charged is one possibility, but it adds to enforcement burdens (in 
particular, of determining appropriate “market prices”), and is difficult to accomplish in 
subsequent sales. A preferable alternative would be to structure the capital subsidy as shared 
equity or as a second mortgage, with the public entity (rather than a financial institution) retaining 
an ownership interest or an investor interest in the property (Bourassa, Greig, and Troy 1995). 
Shared equity mortgages have also been used to enable public housing tenants to buy their own 
homes in Queensland and ACT. They have had limited popularity with first home buyers because 
they are perceived as expensive ways to finance home ownership, limiting the gains from 
property price increases (Herald Sun 2007). Second mortgages for the capital subsidy may be 
simpler to administer – typically, payments on “soft” second mortgages are deferred until the 
home is sold, when the mortgage (and accrued interest) is repaid. It is also possible to structure 
second mortgages so they will be gradually forgiven over time, enabling owners to build wealth if 
they remain in the home. In this way, subsidies can be financially sustainable because they would 
be recaptured if the property were sold within a limited period (five to ten years would be 




Sydney faces a variety of barriers to increasing the housing supply, especially at affordable 
prices. Future labour market competitiveness, social integration and stability, and 
intergenerational equity will be strained by continuing affordability problems. Environmental 
impacts will be intensified by an affordability strategy focused on Greenfield development, and 
that fails to make the best use of existing (and future) infrastructure investments. Providing 
affordable, accessible housing poses multi faceted challenges.  
 
The resources do exist to address these challenges, but current subsidy programs are far less 
effective than they could be. They tend to have perverse rather than complementary effects. 
Resources could be redirected to resolving the housing cost gaps that appear to discourage 
residential development in affordable, accessible locations. This paper argues this could be 
achieved through a combined regulatory / entrepreneurial role for government, rather than 
disconnected roles as regulator and as subsidy source. Such a shift entails substantial institutional 
change. The conditions under which such transformation might be achieved, the related changes 
that would be needed among levels of government, and the political forces that might support or 
undermine such change, pose key questions for future research. Similar transformations have 
been begun or accomplished in other states in Australia, and in other countries, notably the 
United States and Canada. They are difficult but not impossible; the growing affordability crisis 
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